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Notes
E-FFECTUATING NOTICE:
RIO PROPERTIES v. RIO INTERNATIONAL INTERLINK
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, judicial institutions have required that parties re-
ceive notice of an action's commencement.' This fundamental requisite
has survived thousands of years of jurisprudence based on a paramount
concern over fairness to defendants. 2 But what systemically exists as a
rightful protection for litigants has developed into a procedural loophole
through which wily defendants can avoid litigation.3 More specifically, in
certain instances, effectuating notice has become a game of "hide and
seek."
4
1. See Frank Conley, :-) Service With a Smiley: The Effect of E-Mail and Other Elec-
tronic Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 407, 417-18
(1997) (discussing history of service of process and referring to notice as "funda-
mental" feature of law); see also Kent Sinclair, Service Of Process: Rethinking the Theory
and Procedure of Serving Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1187-91
(1987) (detailing antecedents and beginnings of notice).
The notice requirement has existed for more than 4,000 years. See REUVEN
YARON, THE LAws OF ESHNUNNA 8 (Brill Academic Publishers 1997) (1969) (identi-
fying earliest known legal system). One of the earliest known legal codes, the
Code of Eshnunna, required plaintiffs to "shout" or "speak" their cause of action,
which could not commence until the defendant submitted to the tribunal's power.
See id. at 80-81 (translating Code of Eshnunna).
2. See Sinclair, supra note 1, at 1191 (noting that notice serves two fundamen-
tal goals: (1) to provide defendant with notice of existence of claim against him or
her; and (2) to allow defendant opportunity to be heard). For a discussion of
notice in contemporary American jurisprudence, see infra note 15.
3. See, e.g., Aries Ventures Ltd. v. AXA Finance S.A., No. CIV.A.86-4442, 1990
WL 37814, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1990) (granting motion to dismiss for insuffi-
cient service of process after defendant thwarted request for waiver of service by
not returning acknowledgement and defendant could not be served by any other
method under applicable rule).
4. See Rio Props. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that certain defendants play "hide-and-seek" with federal courts); see also
Elecs. Boutique Holding Corp. v. Zuccarini, No. 00-4055, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
765, at *29 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2001) (explaining that "service of process is not a
game of hide and seek," after defendant took steps to avoid service of process). To
illustrate the extent to which defendants can evade service of process, consider the
following excerpt from the deposition of an evasive defendant:
Q. What is your current address?
A. 957 Bristol Pike, Apartment D-6, Andalusia, Pennsylvania 19020.
Q. Is that where you currently reside?
A. Not necessarily.
Q. Where do you currently reside?
A. I don't have-that's my legal address. I really don't have a permanent
address.
(597)
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In the past thirty-five years, developing communication technologies
have made evading notice a more challenging task.5 Through innovations
such as the telex and the facsimile, courts have gained extended reach.
6
Thus, many previously unattainable parties now cannot avoid submission
to a court's jurisdiction. 7
This Note considers the constitutionality of the newest communica-
tion innovation to lasso evasive defendants: electronic mail. In particular,
it explores the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in Rio Properties v. Rio International Interlink,8 the first circuit court case
to evaluate notice through electronic mail.9 Part II contextualizes Rio
Q. Where do you currently reside?
A. Right now I am staying at the Millennium Hotel in New York ....
Q. When you are not in New York for a deposition, where do you live?
Where have you lived in the past two years?
A. I have been living in various places.
Id. at *15 n.6 (providing deposition transcript of defendant who gave up residence
to avoid notice).
5. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1023 (affirming district court's authorization to
use electronic mail to serve evasive defendant); see also F.T.C. v. Zuccarini, No. 01-
4854 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2001) (order granting motion for alternative means of pro-
cess) (authorizing use of electronic mail to serve evasive defendant); Broadfoot v.
Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 718-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (authorizing use of electronic
mail and facsimile to serve evasive defendant); Cooper v. Church of Scientology of
Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783, 786 (D. Mass. 1982) (affirming magistrate's order allowing
use of telex to serve notice upon evasive defendant); New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank
v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(authorizing use of telex to serve evasive defendants); Hollow v. Hollow, No.
CIV.A.RJ137-02-0415, 2002 WL 31056097, at *3-4 (N.Y.S. Aug. 19, 2002) (authoriz-
ing use of electronic mail to serve evasive defendant). For a further discussion of
the technological innovations of the past thirty-five years, see infra notes 44-97 and
accompanying text.
6. See Conley, supra note 1, at 411-12, 420-23 (detailing impact of telex, facsim-
ile and other communication inventions on reach of court); see also Patricia
Bordman, Telefacsimile Documents: A Survey of Uses in the Legal Setting, 36 WAYNE L.
REV. 1361, 1374-79 (1990) (describing use of facsimile in litigation); Catherine
Rubio Kuffner, Legal Issues in Facsimile Use, 5 MEDIA L. & POL'Y 8, 11-13 (1996)
(discussing use of facsimile in procedural contexts); David A. Sokasits, Note, The
Long Arm of the Fax: Service of Process Using Fax Machines, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER &
TECH. L.J. 531, 543-52 (1990) (discussing impact of court-adoption of facsimile);
Yvonne A. Tamayo, Are You Being Served?: E-Mail and (Due) Service of Process, 51 S.C.
L. REV. 227, 246-51 (2000) (discussing convergence of electronic technology and
litigation process).
7. Cf Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 722 (describing impact of technological advances
on defendants' attempts to evade notice).
8. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
9. See id. at 1017 (noting that investigation did not unearth any previous cir-
cuit court decision evaluating service of process through electronic mail); see also
Tamara Loomis, Ninth Circuit Allows E-Mail Service of On-Line Business, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
28, 2002, at 5 (same); Chris Di Edoardo, Papers Can Be Served Via E-Mail, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Mar. 21, 2002, at 3b (noting that Ninth Circuit served as first appellate
court in nation to authorize notice through electronic mail); Gary Young, 9th Cir-
cuit Allows E-Mail Process Service, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 2002, at BI (same); Michael A.
Geibelson & David S. Toepfer, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Approves Service of Process
[Vol. 48: p. 597
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Properties in the greater historical framework, detailing the constitutional
baseline for notice and previous assessments of relevant technologies
under that standard. 10 Part III offers the specific facts and history of the
Rio Properties case. 1 Part IV outlines the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in hold-
ing notice through electronic mail constitutional. 12 Part V critically exam-
ines the court's analysis and its resulting conclusions.1" Finally, Part VI
describes the possible impact of Rio Properties on the notice requirement. 14
II. BACKGROUND
American jurisprudence regards notice as a fundamental procedural
component of commencing litigation. 15 Consequently, every American
jurisdiction has codified its particular requirements for effectuating
by E-mail, at http://www.rkmc.com/news.articles.readl.cfm?AID=195 (last visited
Feb. 6, 2003) (same).
10. For a further discussion of the constitutional baseline for notice and pre-
vious assessments of relevant technologies under that standard, see infra notes 19-
97 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the facts of Rio Properties, see infra notes 98-113
and accompanying text.
12. For a narrative discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Rio Properties,
see infra notes 114-31 and accompanying text.
13. For a critical discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Rio Properties,
see infra notes 132-63 and accompanying text.
14. For a further discussion of the possible impact of Rio Properties on the
notice requirement, see infra notes 164-81 and accompanying text.
15. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(referring to notice as "elementary and fundamental requirement" of due process
in any proceeding). But see Kent Sinclair, Service of Process: Amended Rule 4 and the
Presumption of Jurisdiction, 14 REV. Lunc. 159, 160-63 (1994) (arguing that recent
changes in procedural rules proceed from premise that notice is now only "pesky
ministerial responsibility").
In contemporary jurisprudence, providing notice serves two important func-
tions. See Rachel Cantor, Comment, Internet Service of Process: A Constitutionally Ade-
quate Alternative?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 945 (1999) (noting that service of process
serves notice and evidentiary functions). First, notice provides defendants an op-
portunity to appear and to defend their interests. See Henderson v. United States,
517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996) ("[T]he core function of service is to supply notice of the
pendency of a legal action, in a manner and at a time that affords the defendant a
fair opportunity to answer the complaint and present defenses and objections.");
see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 ("[N]otice must apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions."); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) ("[T]he fundamental requi-
site of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard."). Second, notice
formally gives a court jurisdiction over an action. See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti
Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) ("In the absence of service of process
.... a court ordinarily may not exercise power over a party the complaint names as
defendant."); see also Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97,
104 (1987) ("Before a ... court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defen-
dant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied."); Miss.
Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946) ("[S]ervice of summons is
the procedure by which a court... asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party
served.").
3
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proper notice. 16 For example, in the federal courts, Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure details the essential elements of notice. 17 Among
other components, Rule 4 catalogues available methods of completing ser-
vice of process: the formal operation of providing notice.' 8
Regardless of jurisdictional constraints, notice must comport with
constitutional due process. 19 The United States Supreme Court's forma-
tive decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company20 pro-
vides the contemporary framework for this constitutional requisite. 21
16. SeeJOIINJ. CANNON, MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 84 (2001) (unpub-
lished course materials, on file with author) (noting that, because of notice's im-
portant functions, every jurisdiction has rules, sometimes fairly complex, which
provide components of effectuating proper service of process).
17. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (providing requirements for effectuating notice in
federal jurisdictions). See generally 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 1089.1 (providing overview of Rule 4); David D. Siegel, The
New (Dec. 1, 1993) Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Changes in Summons
Service and PersonalJurisdiction, 151 F.R.D. 441 (1994) (discussing recent changes to
Rule 4).
18. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4 (providing requirements for serving process in federal
jurisdictions). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1372 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "service"
as "the formal delivery of a writ, summons or other legal process"). For example,
Rule 4(e), which details service upon individuals within the United States,
provides:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from
whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than an infant or
an incompetent person, may be effected in any judicial district of the
United States:
(1) pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is located,
or in which service is effected, for the service of a summons upon the
defendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of
the State; or
(2) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
individual personally or by leaving copies thereof at the individual's
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the sum-
mons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). In addition to providing methods for completing service of
process, Rule 4 also discusses the necessary components of notice documents, as
well as other procedural elements. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (providing requirements
for serving process in federal jurisdictions).
19. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14 (noting that due process requires that
"deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case"). The requirement
of due process arises from the Due Process Clauses, located in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V
("No person ... shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."). See generally 16B
AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 890 (2002) (discussing due process requirements
in general).
20. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
21. See Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (noting that Su-
preme Court regularly has turned to Mullane when confronted with issues over
600 [Vol. 48: p. 597
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A. Mullane: The "Reasonably Calculated" Standard
In Mullane, Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company (Central Hano-
ver Bank), trustee of a nearly three-million dollar common trust fund, had
petitioned the New York Surrogate Court to settle its first accounting.22
To provide notice of the pending litigation to the fund's beneficiaries, the
bank published information about the action in a local New York newspa-
per.23 Thereafter, Kenneth Mullane, who represented all non-appearing
parties with a potential interest in the trust fund's income, objected to the
notice as violating due process protections. 24 The trial court overruled
Mr. Mullane's objection, and a New York intermediate appellate court sub-
sequently affirmed. 2
5
On grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court examined
the constitutionality of the notice through newspaper publication.2" Al-
though emphasizing its preference for personal service of written notice,
the Court recognized that certain situations may necessitate other forms of
notice.27 For these instances, the Court delineated the following constitu-
tional standard:
adequacy of notice). For a discussion of Supreme Court cases applying Muttane
over the last fifty years, see infra note 41 and accompanying text.
22. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 309 (discussing facts underlying pending litiga-
tion). Central Hanover Bank established the trust fund under New York banking
law, which provided that, with the approval of the State Banking Board, a trustee
could exclusively manage and control the investment of the assets of an unlimited
number of estates, trusts or other funds. See id. at 308-09 (identifying applicable
laws under which Central Hanover Bank created relevant trust). That same body
of law required the trustee to petition the surrogate court for settlement. See id. at
309 (explaining basis for underlying litigation). By the time of that petition, 113
trusts, from both in-state and otit-of-state beneficiaries, had participated in the
common trust fund. See id. (noting that during accounting period, 113 trusts, ap-
proximately half inter vivos and half testamentary, participated in common trust
fund).
23. See id. at 309-10 (noting that Central Hanover Bank provided notice only
through newspaper publication). Central Hanover Bank provided the absolute
minimum amount of notice available within the applicable banking rule, printing
the name and address of the trust company, the name and date of the common
trust fund's establishment and a list of all participating estates in a local newspaper
once weekly for four successive weeks. See id. (recognizing that Central Hanover
Bank provided notice in compliance with minimum requirement of applicable
banking law).
24. See id. at 311 (noting that Mr. Mullane appeared specially and objected to
court's exercise ofjurisdiction because, under Fourteenth Amendment, notice and
statutory provisions for notice were inadequate to afford beneficiaries due pro-
cess). The surrogate court had appointed Mr. Mullane "special guardian and at-
torney for all persons known or not otherwise appearing who had or might
thereafter have any interest in the income of the common trust fund." See id. at
310 (noting Mr. Mullane's relationship to represented parties).
25. See id. at 311 (discussing procedural posture of case).
26. See id. at 313-20 (considering whether newspaper service on trust fund
beneficiaries satisfied due process).
27. See id. at 313-14 (describing personal service of written notice as "classic
form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding" but recognizing need
NOTE
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An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding ... is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
tions. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey
the required information . . . and it must afford a reasonable
time for those interested to make their appearances.
28
Thus, regardless of the particular brand of service employed, notice must
surmount the "reasonably calculated" baseline.
29
The Court offered one caveat to this requirement.""1 Under particular
circumstances, no available method of effectuating notice would have the
capacity to satisfy the "reasonably calculated" standard."1 In these excep-
tional cases, such as where defendants are missing or unknown, parties
need only adopt a form of service of process "not substantially less likely"
to provide notice than any feasible and customary alternative.
3 2
for other forms of notice under certain circumstances). Personal service involves
actual delivery of the summons and complaint to the defendant. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1164 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "personal service" as "actual delivery of
the notice of process to the person to whom it is directed"); see also Tamayo, supra
note 6, at 234-35 (describing personal service as "delivery to the defendant of the
summons and complaint by a person authorized by law"). For a further discussion
of constitutional forms of notice employed after Mullane, see infra notes 44-97 and
accompanying text.
28. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15. See generally Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457
(1940) (laying foundation for "reasonably calculated to apprise defendants" re-
quirement); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) (laying foundation for both
"reasonably calculated to apprise defendants" and "nature of notice" require-
ments); Priest v. Bd. of Trs. of Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 (1914) (laying foundation
for "reasonably calculated to apprise defendants" requirement); Goodrich v. Fer-
ris, 214 U.S. 71 (1909) (laying foundation for "reasonable time" requirement);
Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 (1900) (laying foundation for both "reasonably calcu-
lated to apprise defendants" and "reasonable time" requirements). Throughout
this Note, I refer to these requirements collectively as the "reasonably calculated"
standard.
To determine the reasonableness of a particular form of notice, courts should
evaluate the effectiveness of the service at issue as compared with feasible alterna-
tives. Compare Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 454-55 (1982) (stating that "reason-
ably calculated" consideration "must be tested with reference to the existence of
'feasible and customary' alternatives and supplements to the form of notice cho-
sen."), with Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318 ("Where the names and post office addresses
of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for resort to
means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency.").
29. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15 (noting that if notice meets "reasonably
calculated" conditions, constitutional requirements are satisfied).
30. See id. at 315 (delineating particularities of "reasonably calculated"
standard).
31. See id. at 315-18 (noting that some situations, such as actions involving
unknown or missing defendants, will not permit any "reasonably calculated"
method of providing notice).
32. See id. at 315 (stating that, in some cases, due process only requires that
form of notice chosen "is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than
other of the feasible and customary substitutes"). Though the court insisted that
[Vol. 48: p. 597
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In light of the "reasonably calculated" standard, the Supreme Court
evaluated the constitutionality of the newspaper service at issue."" The
Court divided the affected beneficiaries into two classes: (1) known benefi-
ciaries of known address (known beneficiaries); and (2) unknown benefi-
ciaries and beneficiaries of unknown address (unknown beneficiaries). 34
Considering the known beneficiaries, the Court found notice through
publication unconstitutional. 35 According to the Court, "where the names
and post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand,
the reasons disappear for resort to means less likely than the mails to ap-
prise them of its pendency. '36 Thus, providing notice upon known benefi-
ciaries through publication could not satisfy the "reasonably calculated"
requirement. 37
For the unknown beneficiaries, however, the Court held that notice
through publication was constitutionally sufficient.3 8 These defendants
fell within the caveat to the general application of the "reasonably calcu-
lated" standard.3 9 Though publication could not reliably provide notice,
no other method of service seemed less likely to fail under the
circumstances. 4
0
"process that is a mere gesture is not due process," it noted that, in cases where no
method of notice can satisfy the "reasonably calculated" standard, "employment of
an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification ... creates no constitu-
tional bar to a final decree foreclosing [defendants'] rights." See id. at 315, 317
(reconciling assertions about "reasonably calculated" standard).
33. See id. at 316-20 (evaluating constitutionality of service of process upon
beneficiaries).
34. See id. (distinguishing between service upon known beneficiaries and ser-
vice upon unknown beneficiaries).
35. See id. at 318-20 (holding statutory notice upon known beneficiaries
inadequate).
36. Id. at 318. The Court regarded service through publication as an always
unreliable means of providing notice. See id. at 315-16, 320 (explaining that publi-
cation alone is not reliable means of providing notice to interested parties because
"chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in
small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper"). But see S.E.C. v. Tome, 833
F.2d 1086, 1093 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding notice through newspaper publication
"reasonably calculated" to provide notice where defendants had actual knowledge
of pending litigation and chosen newspaper targeted individuals in defendants'
business).
37. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318-20 (holding that notice through newspaper
publication deprived known beneficiaries of substantial property rights and, there-
fore, violated Fourteenth Amendment).
38. See id. at 317-18 (holding that notice throtgh publication upon unknown
defendants satisfied due process).
39. See id. at 317 (noting that unknown beneficiaries came clearly within cate-
gory of defendants upon which no form of notice could be "reasonably
calculated").
40. See id. (explaining that, though publication had little likelihood of notify-
ing unknown parties, such notice was not typically "much more likely to fail" than
any other practicable method).
7
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For more than fifty years, the Mullane case has provided the definitive
constitutional framework for notice. 41 During that time, several techno-
logical innovations have changed the way individuals communicate. 42 Just
as Central Hanover Bank called upon the newspaper, modern litigants
have sought to use these new technologies to effectuate notice.
43
B. Post-Mullane Notice Technologies
1. The Telex
In 1980, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York provided the first post-Mullane authorization of notice through a
novel communication technology. 44 That decision, New England Merchants
41. See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (applying
Mullane "reasonably calculated" standard); Tulsa Prof I Collection Serv., Inc. v.
Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988) (same); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462
U.S. 791, 797 (1983) (same); Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 448 (1982) (same);
Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38, 39 (1972) (per curiam) (same); Schroeder v.
City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 210 (1962) (same); Walker v. City of Hutchinson,
352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956) (same); New York City v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford
R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953) (same).
42. See generally COMMUNICATION IN HISTORY: TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND SO-
CIETY (4th Edition) (D.J. Crowley & Paul Heyer eds., Allyn & Bacon 2002) (provid-
ing anthology of historical and contemporary communication technologies);
IRVING FANG, A HISTORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION: SIx INFORMATION REvOLUTIONS
(Focal Press 1997) (narrating history and modern conceptions of communica-
tions); JOSEPH D. STRAUBHAAR & ROBERT LAROSE, MEDIA Now WITH INFOTRAC:
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA IN THE INFORMATION AGE (Wadsworth Pub. Co. 2002)
(discussing past, present and future of mass communications); BRIAN WINSTON,
MEDIA TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A HISTORY: FROM THE TELEGRAPH TO THE IN-
TERNET (Routledge 1998) (discussing rise of communication technologies, from
printing press to Internet).
43. See Rio Props. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming grant of plaintiff's motion for service through electronic mail); see also
Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. CIV.A.02-0133, 2002 WL 1628933, at *3 (W.D.N.Y.
May 31, 2002) (authorizing plaintiff to serve notice through electronic mail);
Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afg., Nos. CIV.A.01-10132, C1V.A.01-10144, 2001
WL 1658211, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) (granting plaintiffs' motion for ser-
vice through television broadcast); F.T.C. v. Zuccarini, No. 01-4854 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
4, 2001) (order granting motion for alternative means of process) (granting plain-
tiff's motion for service through electronic mail); Broadfoot v. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713,
722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (upholding previous grant of plaintiff's motion for
service through electronic mail and facsimile); Cooper v. Church of Scientology of
Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783, 786 (D. Mass. 1982) (affirming magistrate's grant of plain-
tiff's motion for service through telex); Int'l Schs. Serv. v. Gov't of Iran, 505 F.
Supp. 178, 179 (D.N.J. 1981) (granting plaintiff's motion for service through
telex); New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission
Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting plaintiff's motion for service
through telex); Hollow v. Hollow, No. CIV.A.RJ137-02-0415, 2002 WL 31056097, at
*4 (N.Y.S. Aug. 19, 2002) (finding plaintiff's use of electronic mail to serve notice
proper). For a further discussion of the use of modern technologies to effectuate
notice, see infra notes 44-97 and accompanying text.
44. Cf Conley, supra note 1, at 421-22 (beginning catalogue of "groundbreak-
ing cases" involving new technologies to effectuate notice with New England
Merchants); Sokastis, supra note 6, at 543 (commencing discussion of "extraordi-
[Vol. 48: p. 597
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National Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission Company,45 author-
ized service of process via telex.
4 6
In New England Merchants, a collection of American plaintiffs sought
monetary damages to redress alleged civil wrongs committed by various
Iranian defendants. 4 7 After diplomatic relations and other communica-
tion channels broke down between the United States and Iran in the late
1970s, the plaintiffs could not serve notice through the methods enumer-
ated within the applicable rule.
48
After evaluating the situation, the district court ordered service of
process via telex.4 9 Though this procedure had no precedent in American
jurisprudence, the court found it constitutionally sufficient for two rea-
nary methods" of service with New England Merchants); Tamayo, supra note 6, at 248
(initiating consideration of cases involving technologies used to effectuate service
of process with New England Merchants).
45. 495 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
46. See id. at 81-82 (ordering service of process through telex and other
means). Telex, a breed of telegraph service linking one typewriter keyboard to
another that prints copies, enables subscribers to send messages and data directly
to other subscribers throughout the world. See C. Sandler, Electronic Mail: The
Paperless Revolution, PC MAC., Jan. 1, 1983, at 52-53 (discussing evolution of elec-
tronic mail); see also The Telegraph (Microsoft Encarta 2002 Encyclopedia CD-ROM
2002) (describing technologies associated with telegraph). See generally COMMUNI-
CATION IN HISTORY, supra note 42 (discussing telex and other contemporary com-
munication technologies); FANG, supra note 42 (same); STRAUBHAAR & LAROSE,
supra note 42 (same); WINSTON, supra note 42 (same).
47. See New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 75 (detailing nature of suits, which
sought monetary damages for alleged civil wrongs ranging from nationalization of
private property to repudiation of executory contracts). The district court consoli-
dated 89 cases, each similar in nature and against the same set of defendants, to
address the common service of process issue. See id. (discussing procedural pos-
ture of case). Defendants included Iran, Iranian agencies and instrumentalities
and private Iranian corporate entities. See id. at 77 (identifying defendants in
case).
48. See id. at 76 (discussing components of service of process under Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611). Numerous factors impeded
service upon defendants, including Iran's political climate, an apparent break-
down in the Iranian postal service and the severance of diplomatic relations be-
tween Iran and the United States. See id. (noting that several factors combined to
render compliance with service of process requirement "virtually impossible").
49. See id. at 81-82 ("Plaintiffs are to send in Farsi and English a telex message
to the individual defendants the text of the summons, a notice of suit.., and a
notice that a copy of the pleadings will be mailed under separate cover."). Rule
4(f) (3), the applicable procedural rule, authorized the court to fashion a mode of
service "consistent with the law of the place where service is to be made." See id. at
78 (discussing rule that authorized alternative means of service). In the same Or-
der, the court required plaintiffs to serve a copy of all pleadings upon those attor-
neys who already had filed notice of appearance on the defendants' behalf. See id.
(detailing ordered notice's components). This requirement ensured that, at least,
the defendants' attorneys could provide a defense. See Sokastis, supra note 6, at
545 (noting that service upon defendants' attorneys preserved defendants' due
process rights).
9
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sons. 50 First, the Iranian defendants had received actual notice of the law-
suit. 1 Because the due process requirement had "long since been
vindicated," the court allowed telex service only to make "absolutely sure"
defendants received notice.5 2 Second, telex remained a viable communi-
cation medium to which nearly all defendants had access.
53
While New England Merchants dealt particularly with telex, the case for-
warded a greater principle: new communication technologies could effec-
tuate notice within constitutional boundaries. 5 4 As the court stated:
Courts... cannot be blind to changes and advances in technol-
ogy. No longer do we live in a world where communications are
conducted solely by mail carried by fast sailing clipper or steam
ships. Electronic communication via satellite can and does pro-
vide instantaneous transmission of notice and information. No
longer must process be mailed to a defendant's door when he
[or she] can receive complete notice at an electronic terminal
inside his [or her] very office, even when the door is steel and
bolted shut.
5 5
50. See New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 81-82 (evaluating sufficient modes of
service upon defendants and noting that service through telex had little or no
precedent in American jurisprudence).
51. See id. at 80-81 (noting that "all indications" showed that defendants had
received actual notice of commencement of actions). The court also noted that.
defendants were intentionally evading service of process by "hiding behind the
hyper-technical" rule requirements. See id. (concluding that defendants' conduct
could only be interpreted as intentional avoidance in order to frustrate instant
suits).
52. See id. at 81 (providing rationale behind telex service). The defendants'
actual notice appears to play an important role in the court's decision to order
notice through telex. Cf New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Generation
and Transmission Co., 508 F. Supp. 49, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (referring to previous
cases authorizing cable delivery of requisite documents "when there was evidence
that actual delivery had been effected").
53. See New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. StIpp. at 81 n.4 (noting that telecommtmica-
tions remained sound method to insure that defendants' received notice of ac-
tion). Though the court did not refer to telex service as satisfying the "reasonably
calculated" standard, the organization of its reasoning seems to point to this con-
clusion. Cf id. at 75-82 (discussing and evaluating case). The court first cited
Worldwide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), which encapsulates the
"reasonably calculated" standard. See id. at 81 ('justice demands that a substitute
form of service be formulated [sic] one calculated to provide defendants with ade-
quate notice of the pendency and nature of the instant suits."). The court then
ordered notice through telex. See id. (ordering service of process through telex).
Therefore, it seems logical to conclude that the court considered service by telex
sufficient in light of the "reasonably calculated" standard. See generally id. (provid-
ing constitutional analysis of service of process through telex).
54. Cf id. at 81-82 (authorizing service of process via communication technol-
ogy for first time after Mullane).
55. Id. at 81.
[Vol. 48: p. 597
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This unprecedented statement about technology's practical impact fore-
shadowed future innovations in notice.56
2. The Facsimile
In the shadow of New England Merchants, several commentators theo-
rized about whether another budding communication technology-the
facsimile-could also sufficiently effectuate notice.5 7 In a Note entitled
56. See Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afg., Nos. CIV.A.01-10132, CIV.A.01-
10144, 2001 WL 1658211, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) (ordering service of
process via television broadcast for first time, after New England Merchants); see also
Broadfoot v. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (ordering service of
process via electronic mail and facsimile for first time, after New England
Merchants). For a further discussion of the use of modern technologies to effectu-
ate notice, see infra notes 44-97 and accompanying text.
After New England Merchants, at least two other courts approved notice
through telex. Cf Cooper v. Church of Scientology of Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783, 786
(D. Mass. 1982) (affirming magistrate's order allowing telex to provide notice to
evasive defendant); Int'l Schs. Serv. v. Gov't of Iran, 503 F. Supp. 178, 178 (D.N.J.
1981) (ordering notice through telex on government of Iran). In International
Schools Service v. Government of Iran, 503 F. Supp. 178 (D.N.J. 1981), the plaintiff
could not serve process through standard methods due to poor diplomatic rela-
tions between the United States and Iran. See Prachand v. Gov't of India Tourist
Office, No. CIV.A.92-4336, 1992 WL 245523, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 1992) (pro-
viding facts of International Schools Service when distinguishing case). While the
court authorized notice through telex, it did not engage in any discernable consti-
tutional analysis. Cf Int'l Schs, Serv., 503 F. Supp. at 179 (discussing propriety of
service through telex). Like the New England Merchants court, the International
Schools Service court commented generally on technology in the notice context:
"Modern technology, with communications satellites and other sophisticated de-
vises, ought not to be deprived the opportunity to attempt effective service, if it
can." Id.
In Cooper v. Church of Scientology of Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783 (D. Mass. 1982), the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts affirmed a magis-
trate's order allowing substituted service through telex and other channels. See
Cooper, 92 F.R.D. at 786 (affirming magistrate's order to provide notice by sending
telex messages and other means). Defendant L. Ron Hubbard had continuously
attempted to avoid service of process. See id. at 784 (providing magistrate's percep-
tion of Mr. Hubbard's conduct). Thus, the magistrate ordered the Church of
Scientology, Mr. Hubbard's agent, to send notice of the pending lawsuit by telex to
all terminals within its telex system. See id. at 784 (detailing magistrate's order to
provide notice by telex to all church terminals throughout world). The district
court found the magistrate's notice procedures "reasonably calculated to give ac-
tual notice" to Mr. Hubbard. See id. at 785-86 (finding service methods ordered by
magistrate reasonably likely to provide notice to defendants). But see Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 320 (1950) (providing that publi-
cation-like forms of notice upon missing defendants, such as Cooper court's service
through telex spamming, can not ever satisfy "reasonably calculated" standard).
57. See Bordman, supra note 6, at 1374-77 (analyzing adoption of facsimile for
service of papers in litigation); see also Kuffner, supra note 6, at 11-12 (considering
use of facsimile in procedural contexts); Sokastis, supra note 6, at 538-54 (arguing
that courts should adopt facsimile to effectuate notice). Facsimile, a combination
telephone and photocopier, allows people to share exact copies of papers by dupli-
cating and sending them on one end and receiving and reproducing them on the
other, all through telephone lines. See Bordman, supra note 6, at 1361-62 (describ-
ing facsimile); see also Facsimile Transmission (Microsoft Encarta 2002 Encyclopedia
2003] NOTE 607
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The Long Arm of the Fax: Service of Process Using Fax Machines,58 one such
commentator promoted facsimile as a practicable and constitutionally suf-
ficient new method for serving notice.59 According to the Note, notice by
facsimile could satisfy due process requirements by instantly and reliably
providing an exact reproduction of notice documents to interested
parties. 6°
In one of the few published opinions on the subject, Broadfoot v.
Diaz,6 1 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Georgia arrived at this same conclusion.3 2 In Broadfoot, an evasive defen-
CD-ROM 2002) (explaining how facsimile functions); Kuffner, supra note 6, at 8
(providing overview and history of facsimile); Sokastis, supra note 6, at 532-38
(describing facsimile technology); Lee Sustar, Fax Technology Has Had Long History,
But Became Accepted Only Recently, PC WEEK, Feb. 9, 1988, v.5 n.6 (discussing growth
of facsimile). See generally COMMUNICATION IN HISTORY, supra note 42 (discussing
facsimile and other contemporary communication technologies); FANG, supra note
42 (same); STRAUBHAAR & LAROSE, supra note 42 (same); WINSTON, supra note 42
(same).
58. Sokasits, supra note 6.
59. See id. at 532, 538-54 (promoting fax as "a practicable new method for
serving initial process of summons and complaint, and as a method for serving
mesne process, interlocutory notices, orders, motions and other documents during
litigation by one party upon another").
60. See id. (arguing that review of capabilities of available facsimile machines
and past uses of facsimile and similar methods for delivering notice places service
of process by facsimile on "firm legal footing"). In particular, the commentator
contended that facsimile satisfies the "provide notice" requirement because "faxed
service of process immediately delivers to the defendant an exact reproduction of
the original itself" and meets the "adequate time to be heard" requirement be-
cause "delivery is immediate." See id. at 539-41 (considering notice through facsim-
ile under each component of Mullane "reasonably calculated" standard). Though
endorsing service through facsimile, the commentator recognized potential
problems confronting such service, such as transmitting documents that one be-
lieves defendant has received to incorrect locations or sending "garbled" messages.
See id. at 541 (discussing methods of overcoming potential problems in notice
through facsimile).
61. 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000).
62. See id. at 718-22 (finding use of facsimile to effectuate notice constitution-
ally sufficient). At least one other court has also found notice through facsimile
proper. See Int'l Techs. Integration, Inc. v. Palestine Liberation Org., 66 F. Supp.
2d 3, 11-14 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding notice of arbitration through facsimile and
mail adequate). In International Technologies Integration, Inc. v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, 66 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 1999), a district court held notice through
facsimile and mail constitutional because "[t] he lengths to which plaintiffs went to
apprise [the defendant] of the arbitration evince[d] methods that one who genu-
inely wished to communicate with another would employ-methods that would
almost certainly succeed." See id. (holding that defendant received "adequate, if
not actual," notice of arbitration).
Well before Broadfoot and International Technologies, at least three states, Utah,
Idaho and Montana, allowed facsimile to play some role in service of initial pro-
cess. See IDAHO R. Civ. P. 4 (2001) ("Service may be transmitted by facsimile ma-
chine process or telegraph and the copy transmitted may be served or executed by
the officer or person to whom sent, and returned in the same manner, and with
the same force, effect, authority and liability as the original."); MONT. CODE ANN.
25-3-501 (2001) ("Any summons, writ, or order in any civil action or proceeding
608 [Vol. 48: p. 597
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dant had intentionally concealed his location and failed to respond to in-
quiries regarding his whereabouts. 63 Consequently, the plaintiff could not
effectuate notice through traditionally available methods.
6 4
Upon the plaintiff's motion, the court authorized three forms of alter-
nate service: mail to the defendant's last known address, electronic mail
and facsimile. 6 5 Regarding the latter two modes of notice, the facts con-
clusively demonstrated that the defendant preferred to receive all commu-
nications through either electronic mail or facsimile.6 6 Thus, like any
method of communication utilized and preferred by a defendant, effectu-
ating notice through these two communication channels sufficiently pro-
tected the defendant's due process rights.
67
and all other papers requiring service may be transmitted by telegraph or tele-
phone for such service in any place."); UTAH R. Civ. P. 4 (2002) (providing for
service by "telegraph or telephone" before recent amendments eliminated such
service because it "could be ordered under [the rule] if appropriate"). Addition-
ally, several jurisdictions, including the federal courts, now accommodate service
of pleadings and other papers by electronic means, including facsimile, upon re-
cipient's consent. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 5 ("Service under Rule 5(a) is made by
... [d]elivering a copy by any other means, including electronic means, consented
to in writing by the person served."). Likewise, the Federal Rules Advisory Com-
mittee, which organizes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has discussed amend-
ing Rule 4 to permit service of initial notice through electronic means. See
Symposium,Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REx'. 1, 33 (1996) (discussing Advi-
sory Committee's consideration of notice through electronic means).
Despite the dearth of case law on the constitutionality of notice through fac-
simile, numerous courts have considered facsimile's application in other procedti-
ral contexts. See, e.g., Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1430-31 (9th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that service of papers by facsimile did not satisfy FED. R.
Civ. P. 5(b)); Calabrese v. Springer Personnel of N.Y., Inc., 534 N.Y.S.2d 83, 83-84
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (authorizing service by facsimile of Order to answer interroga-
tories). Seegenerally 62B AM.JUR. 2D Process § 140 (2002) (providing general discus-
sion of use of facsimile and other electronic means for service of notice or other
papers).
63. See Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 718-19 (discussing need for alternative service
upon defendant). Among other evasive tactics, the defendant did not maintain a
personal residence in the United States, refused to give the plaintiff his telephone
number and traveled extensively. See id. at 718 (describing defendant's steps to
avoid litigation).
64. See id. at 718-22 (describing defendant as "moving target" who made it
"virtually impossible" for plaintiff to find him and to effectuate service by tradi-
tional means available within FED. R. Civ. P. 4).
65. See id. at 716-17 (discussing facts of case). The applicable procedural rule,
Rule 4(f) (3), gave the court authority to fashion an alternative mode of service. See
id. at 719 (noting that FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) "empowers courts to fit the manner of
service utilized to the facts and circumstances of the particular case"). For a fur-
ther discussion of notice through electronic mail and the Broadfoot court's decision
authorizing such notice, see infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
66. See Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 718-19 (detailing defendant's embrace of elec-
tronic mail and facsimile as his preferred and often sole means of
communication).
67. See id. at 721-22 (holding that ordered notice satisfied "reasonably calcu-
lated" requirement). The court noted that serving process through a defendant's
preferred means of communication will always satisfy due process. See id. at 721
13
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In the spirit of New England Merchants, the Broadfoot court compli-
mented its factual analysis with a brief discourse about technology's practi-
cal impact on notice.6 In relevant part, the court offered:
[C]ourts are not required to turn a blind eye to society's em-
bracement of . . . technological advances . . . . A defendant
should not be allowed to evade service by confining himself [or
herself] to modern technological methods of communication
not specifically mentioned in [procedural rules] .... The practi-
cal reality recognized and given effect by the New England
Merchants court in 1980 applies with even greater force today."9
Thus, like New England Merchants, Broadfoot strongly endorsed the contin-
ued embrace of new communication technologies to effectuate notice. 7"
3. The Television
After Broadfoot, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York authorized service of process via another modern com-
munication technology: the television. 7 ' That decision, Smith v. The
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,72 remains the only known authority to assess
the constitutional sufficiency of such notice. 73
In Smith, the plaintiffs brought an action against defendants Osama
Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, the Taliban and The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
("[I]f any methods of communication can be reasonably calculated to provide a
defendant with real notice, surely those communication channels utilized and pre-
ferred by the defendant himself [or herself] must be included among them.").
68. See id. at 721-22 (discussing role of technology in notice context).
69. Id.
70. Compare id. at 718-19 (providing discussion of courts' ability to use techno-
logical advances in notice context), with New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran
Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dis-
cussing courts' responsibility to recognize technology's impacts).
71. See Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afg., Nos. CIV.A.01-10132, CIV.A.01-
10144, 2001 WL 1658211, at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) (ordering service of
process via television broadcast). Television, a system of sending and receiving
pictures and sound by means of electronic signals, broadcasts signals from a cen-
tral source, a television station, to reception devices, such as television sets in
homes. See Television (Microsoft Encarta 2002 Encyclopedia CD-ROM 2002) (pro-
viding overview of functioning of television). See generally COMMUNICATION IN HIs-
TrORV, supra note 42 (discussing television and other contemporaly communication
technologies); FANG, supra note 42 (same); STRAUBHAAR & LAROSE, supra note 42
(same); WINSTON, supra note 42 (same).
72. Nos. CIV.A.01-10132, CIV.A.01-10144, 2001 WL 1658211 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
26, 2001).
73. See Melissa Sepos, Media May Be Used to Serve Notice on Bin Laden, Al Qaeda,
N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9, 2002, at 8 (2002) [hereinafter Sepos, Media] (regarding Smith as
"first known attempt" to serve summons by broadcast); see also Melissa Sepos, Judge
OKs Suits Against Bin Laden Being Served Via Newspapers, TV, BROWARD DAILY Bus.
REv.,Jan. 15, 2002, at 8 [hereinafter Sepos, Judge] (same); Melissa Sepos, TV, News-
paper Ads Will Be Used to Notify Bin Laden, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 2002, at 3
[hereinafter Sepos, 7/] (same).
[Vol. 48: p. 597
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based on defendants' alleged involvement in the September 11, 2001 at-
tack on the World Trade Center.7 4 Due to "the futility" of methods pro-
vided within the applicable rule, the plaintiffs moved for service by
alternative means.
75
The court authorized service of process upon Mr. Bin Laden and Al
Qaeda via newspaper publication and television broadcast.76 The wherea-
bouts of these two defendants remained unknown. 7 7 Thus, only this "unu-
sual method of notification," coupling newspaper publication with
television broadcast, could likely provide defendants with notice of the
pending litigation and, thereby, satisfy due process requirements. 78 Me-
dia coverage alone would not suffice to provide notice through television,
though. 79 The plaintiffs had to purchase actual advertising time from rel-
evant broadcasters. 80
The court refused to allow such service on the Taliban or The Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan, however. 8' Unlike Mr. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda,
74. See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *1 (discussing common causes of action in
two underlying law suits consolidated by court to address service of process issue).
75. See id. (discussing plaintiffs' request for service by alternative means "due
to the futility of the preferred means of service provided in [FED. R. Crv. P.] 4(f) (1-
2)").
76. See id. at *3 (ordering service of process via publication for six weeks in
relevant newspapers and on broadcasters Al jazeera, Turkish CNN, BBC World,
ARN and ADF). The court fashioned this alternative mode of service pursuant to
the applicable procedural rle, FED. R. Ctr. P. 4(f). See id. at *2 (noting applicable
procedural rule).
77. See id. at *24 (determining that, regarding Mr. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda,
"the unfortunate reality seems to be that no legitimate authority knows [their]
location").
78. See id. (relying on S.E.C. v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1978), to find
newspaper publication "reasonably likely" to notify Mr. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda).
See Sepos, judge, supra note 73, at 8 (referring to court Order as "unusual method
of notification"); see also Sepos, Media, supra note 73, at 8 (same); Sepos, TV, supra
note 73, at 3 (same). The court noted that Mr. Bin Laden could "be presumed to
know that the estates of the victims would file civil cases against him in the district
arising from the attack on the World Trade Center for which he has been widely
held accountable." See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *3 (noting presumption that
Mr. Bin Laden had actual knowledge of suit). For a further discussion of the con-
stitutionality of notice through publication, see supra notes 2243 and accompany-
ing text.
79. See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *3 (explaining that, regarding broadcast-
ers, "notice to the network in hopes of media coverage" would not meet court's
requirements). The court did not elaborate on its rationale for this requirement.
See id. (failing to provide reasoning for specifying broadcast requirement).
80. See id. (describing protocol for notice through television broadcast re-
quirement). Plaintiffs' lawyers estimated that the necessary broadcast media
purchases would cost $100,000. See Sepos, Media, supra note 73, at 8 (noting ex-
pected cost of completing notice through television broadcast); Sepos, TV, supra
note 73, at 3 (same).
81. See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *4 (distinguishing circumstances sur-
rounding Mr. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda from those surrounding Taliban and The
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan).
15
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these defendants maintained discernable locations. 82 Thus, because "ser-
vice by publication is disfavored and personal service [was] available," the
plaintiffs could not use newspaper publication or television broadcast to
serve notice.8 3 Instead, the plaintiffs had to effectuate personal service.8 4
4. Electronic Mail
The most recently employed service of process technology-elec-
tronic mail-received widespread consideration by commentators before
the courts evaluated its potential applications. 85 In a Comment published
in the University of Chicago Law Review, one such commentator argued that
electronic mail could offer a constitutionally sound method of effecting
notice: "[G]iven the popularity of the internet in our society, internet ser-
vice of process will often be constitutionally adequate and may even be
constitutionally required." 86 To support this conclusion, the commenta-
tor evidenced the widespread acceptance of electronic mail, as well as its
reliability and security.8 7
As discussed above, Broadfoot, the first judicial analysis of the constitu-
tionality of notice through electronic mail, only strengthened this com-
82. See id. (noting that, unlike Mr. Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, Taliban and The
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan were "not entirely hidden from view").
83. See id. (noting availability of personal service and describing preference
for such service). For a discussion of personal service, see supra note 27 and ac-
companying text.
84. See Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *4 (holding that plaintiffs could serve
Taliban and The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) (3)
by personal service on specified high-ranking member of both parties).
85. See Cantor, supra note 15, at 958-66 (arguing for adoption of service of
process over Internet); see also Conley, supra note 1, at 421-22 (discussing English
case authorizing service through electronic mail, before any such American deci-
sion); Symposium, supra note 62, at 31-34 (discussing service of process through
cyberspace); Tamayo, supra note 6, at 244-57 (contending that courts should adopt
service of process through electronic mail). Electronic mail, a method of transmit-
ting data or text files via an intranet or the Internet, enables computer users to
create, send and receive messages from individual computers using commercial e-
mail programs. See E-Mail (Microsoft Encarta 2002 Encyclopedia CD-ROM 2002)
(providing overview of electronic mail). See generally COMMUNICATION IN HISTORY,
supra note 42 (discussing electronic mail and other contemporary communication
technologies); FANG, supra note 42 (same); STRAUBHAAR & LAROSE, supra note 42
(same); WINSTON, supra note 42 (same).
86. Cantor, supra note 15, at 967.
87. See id. at 943, 964-67 (arguing that notice through electronic mail will
"frequently be a method of service reasonably calculated to reach a defendant"
and, therefore, can satisfy due process requirements). The commentator noted
that nearly 150 million users trafficked the Internet in 1998, a number expected to
double by 2005. See id. at 943 (discussing rapid growth of Internet). She attrib-
uted this massive penetration to the Internet's "unparalleled speed and efficiency
in communication and information gathering." See id. (explaining reasons for In-
ternet's success). The commentator also argued that electronic mail could pro-
vide a superior form of notice because such notice "may be more likely to result in
actual notice than traditional mail or even personal service." See id. at 964 (discuss-
ing constitutionality of notice through electronic mail).
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mentator's position. 88 In Broadfoot, the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Georgia concluded that service through fac-
simile and electronic mail, defendant's preferred channels of communica-
tion, satisfied due process requirements.
8 9
Shortly after Broadfoot, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania likewise found service through electronic mail
constitutional. 90 In F.T.C. v. Zuccarini,9' an evasive defendant made no-
88. SeeBroadfootv. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 718-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (noting
that "extensive research" did not uncover any American case considering notice
through electronic mail and holding notice through electronic mail constitution-
ally sufficient in case at bar); see also Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d
1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2002) (regarding Broadfoot as first and only American court to
authorize notice through electronic mail); Bankruptcy Court Issues Default Judgment
Based on Failure to Answer E-Mailed Service, U.S. L. WK., Sept. 28, 1999, at 2167 (iden-
tifying Broadfoot as first American case to authorize service of process through elec-
tronic mail); Barney Tumey, Bankruptcy Court Issues Default Judgment Based on Failure
to Answer E-Mailed Service, ELEC. COM. & L. REP., Sept. 22, 1999, at 86 (same).
Before Broadfoot, an English court similarly approved the use of electronic mail to
provide notice. See Conley, supra note 1, at 421-22 (discussing English case); see also
Wendy R. Liebowitz, UK. Court: Serve Process Via E-mail, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1996, at
BI (reporting on English case); Tamayo, supra note 6, at 244-46 (discussing British
case). Moreover, at least three pre-Broadfoot American courts had considered the
applicability of electronic mail or a similar technology tinder procedural rules. See
Wawa, Inc. v. Christensen, No. CIV.A.99-1454, 1999 WL 557936, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa.
July 27, 1999) (holding that FED. R. Civ. P. 4 did not approve service of process by
electronic mail); see also Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579
(N.D. Ca. 1999) (same); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 57, 62-64 (D.
Mass. 1996) (holding that Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which
provided requirements for commencing class actions, allowed posting of press re-
lease on Internet Web site to satisfy publication requirement).
Under the recently enacted Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,
the owner of a trademark now may provide notice of an in rem civil action against
an infringing domain name through electronic mail. See Anti-Cybersquatting Con-
sumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2) (A) (ii) (1999) (providing rules pro-
tecting individuals from cybersquatters); see also Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.
inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521, 523 (E.D. Va. 2000) (describing notice require-
ments of Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act). Likewise, the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee has discussed amending Rule 4 to permit service of ini-
tial notice through electronic means. See Symposium, supra note 62, at 33 (discuss-
ing Advisory Committee's consideration of notice through electronic means). The
Advisory Committee has adopted a recent amendment that now accommodates
service of pleadings and other papers by electronic means, subject to the recipi-
ent's consent. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5 ("Service under Rule 5(a) is made by ...
[d]elivering a copy by any other means, including electronic means, consented to
in writing by the person served.").
89. See Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 721-22 (describing reasoning in finding notice
through electronic mail constitutional). For a further discussion of the Broadfoot
court's rationale in holding notice through electronic mail constitutional, see
supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
90. See F.T.C. v. Zuccarini, No. 014854 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2001) (order grant-
ing motion for alternative means of process) (authorizing use of electronic mail to
serve evasive defendant).
91. No. 01-4854 (E.D. Pa. Oct 4, 2001).
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tice through traditional service methods unfeasible. 9 2 Consequently, the
plaintiff moved for service by alternative means.9 3 In its supporting brief,
the plaintiff persuasively argued that effectuating notice through elec-
tronic mail would provide the defendant, who regularly used and favored
communications through electronic mail, with actual notice of the pro-
ceeding. 94 Thus, as in Broadfoot, notice through defendant's preferred
communication channel allayed any due process concerns.
95
Amidst mounting authority on the sufficiency of notice through elec-
tronic mail and other communication innovations, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confronted Rio Properties v. Rio Inter-
national Interlink.96 With this enterprise, for the first time in history, a fed-
eral appellate court contemplated the core issue underlying notice
through modern technology: procedural due process. 97
III. FACTS: RIO PROPERTIES V. Rio INTERNATIONAL INTERLINK 9 8
In Rio Properties, Rio Properties, Inc. (Rio Properties), a Las Vegas ho-
tel and casino operator, filed suit against Rio International Interlink (Rio
International), a Costa Rican Internet sports gambling business.99 Its
92. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion (1) for
Alternative Means of Service of Process, (2) to Continue the Preliminary Injunc-
tion Hearing and (3) to Extend the Temporary Restraining Order at 3-14, F.T.C. v.
Zuccarini, No. 01-4854 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2001) (discussing means previously at-
tempted to overcome "defendant's chronic pattern of deception and evasion in
the face of legal process").
93. See Zuccarini, No. 01-4854 (order granting motion for alternative means of
process).
94. See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law at 17-19, Zuccarini (No. 01-4854) (ar-
guing that defendant would receive actual notice through electronic mail because
he regularly tsed that medium to communicate).
95. See Zuccarini, No. 01-4854 (order granting motion for alternative means of
process) (granting plaintiffs motion for alternative means of process). Compare id.
(authorizing service through electronic mail after defendant showed clear prefer-
ence for such communications), with Broadfoot v. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 722 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2000) (upholding previous grant of plaintiff's motion for service through
electronic mail and facsimile after defendant exhibited preference for those com-
munication channels).
96. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
97. Cf id. (providing list of previous courts approving notice through modern
technologies, which did not include any federal appellate courts).
98. 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. See id. at 1012 (discussing facts of case). Rio Properties owned the All-
Stite Casino Resort, a well-regarded Las Vegas hotel, and the Rio Race & Sports
Book, which allowed customers to wager on professional sports. See id. (describing
Rio Properties's business operations). To supplement its offline operations, Rio
Properties expanded onto the Internet through www.playrio.com, where prospec-
tive customers received information about the hotel. See id. (discussing Rio
Properties's Web site).
Rio International did business variously as Rio International Sportsbook, Rio
Online Sportsbook or Rio International Sports. See id. (identifying Rio Interna-
tional's trade names). Under these names, Rio International enabled customers to
wager on sporting events online at www.riosports.com or via a toll-free telephone
614 [Vol. 48: p. 597
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complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Ne-
vada, asserted various statutory and common law trademark infringement
claims.'("
To commence litigation against Rio International, Rio Properties
took several measures to effect service of process.' 0 1 Conventional service
methods proved ineffective, however, and Rio Properties filed an emer-
gency motion for alternate service of process.' 0 2 Pursuant to Federal
number. See id. (discussing Rio International's business operations). Rio Interna-
tional grossed more than three million dollars annually. See id. (noting magnitude
of Rio International's operation).
100. See id. at 1012-13 (describing natture of Rio Properties's claims against
Rio International). Rio Properties had registered numerous trademarks with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office to protect its "Rio" name. See id. at
1012 (discussing Rio Properties's efforts to maintain its exclusive rights in its
name). Rio Properties discovered Rio International's potential infringement upon
those trademarks through Rio International's advertisements in the Football Betting
Guide '98 Preview and the Daily Racing Forum (Nevada edition) and spots on Las
Vegas radio. See id. (revealing means through which Rio Properties became aware
of Rio International's existence).
Before commencing suit against Rio International, Rio Properties first sent a
letter to Rio International, demanding that the company cease and desist from
operating its www.riosports.com Web site. See id. (describing Rio Properties's ini-
tial measures to reconcile matter). While Rio International did not formally re-
spond, it promptly disabled the objectionable Web site but then activated an
identical operation at www.betrio.com. See id. (noting Rio International's response
to Rio Properties's cease and desist letter).
101. See id. at 1013 (discussing Rio Properties's efforts to serve Rio
International).
102. See id. (noting Rio Properties's actions after failing to serve Rio Interna-
tional). Rio Properties first attempted to serve Rio International within the United
States. See id. (discussing Rio Properties's initial attempt to effectuate notice). Af-
ter some investigation, Rio Properties discovered a Miami, Florida address that Rio
International claimed when registering the allegedly infringing domain names. See
id. (noting Rio Properties's efforts to locate Rio International). That address only
housed Rio International's courier, IEC, though. See id. (discussing Rio Interna-
tional's address in United States). While IEC did not have authorization to accept
service of process on Rio International's behalf, it agreed to forward the summons
and complaint to Rio International's Costa Rican courier. See id. (describing role
of IEC).
Thereafter, Los Angeles attorney John Carpenter, whom Rio International
had contacted about the potential litigation, called Rio Properties about the law-
suit. See id. (detailing Rio International's response to Rio Properties's service of
process). Rio Properties asked Mr. Carpenter to accept service on Rio Interna-
tional's behalf, but Mr. Carpenter politely declined. See id. (discussing conversa-
tion between Mr. Carpenter and Rio Properties).
Unable to serve Rio International within the United States, Rio Properties
then considered serving Rio International in Costa Rica. See id. (discussing subse-
quent attempts to effect service of process on Rio International). These efforts
also proved ineffective, however. See id. (noting that Rio Properties's search of
international directory databases looking for Rio International's Costa Rican ad-
dress proved fruitless).
Rio International did not respond to Rio Properties's motion for alternate service
of process. See id. (discussing Rio International's failure to respond to Rio Proper-
ties's motion).
2003] NOTE
19
Chacker: E-Ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio International Interli
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
VIILANOVA LA-W REVIEW
Rules of Civil Procedure 4(h)(2)11 3 and 4(f) (3),104 the court ordered ser-
vice of process in three forms, including by mail to Rio International's
lawyer, by mail to Rio International's courier and through electronic mail
to Rio International's electronic mail address, email@betrio.com'1
5
Rio International formally responded to the court-sanctioned ser-
vice. 10 6 Initially, the company filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient
service of process and lack of personal jurisdiction. 10 7 The district court
denied that motion, and Rio International subsequently filed its an-
swer.'" As litigation proceeded, Rio International offered "almost en-
tirely useless" responses to Rio Properties's interrogatory and other
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(h). In pertinent part, Rule 4(h), which governs service
of process upon corporations and associations, provides:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon a domestic or for-
eign corporation or upon a partnership or other unincorporated associa-
tion that is subject to suit under a common name, and from which a
waiver of service has not been obtained and filed, shall be effected:
(1) .. . .
(2) in a place not within any judicial district of the United States in any
manner prescribed for individuals by subdivision (/) except personal deliveiy.
Id. (emphasis added).
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). In pertinent part, Rule 4(f), which governs service of
process upon individuals in a foreign country, provides:
Unless otherwise provided by federal law, service upon an individual from
whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed ... may be effected in a
place not within any judicial district of the United States:
(1) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give no-
tice, such as those means authorized by the Hague Convention . . . ; or
(2) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applica-
ble international agreement allows other means of service, provided that
service is reasonably calculated to give notice: (A) in the manner pre-
scribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an
action in any of its courts of general jurisdiction; or (B) as directed by the
foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or a letter of request; or
(C) ... ; or
(3) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by
the court.
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of certain "other means not prohibited by
international agreement" that courts have directed, see supra notes 38-40, 49-53,
65-67, 76-80, 88-95 and accompanying text.
105. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1013 (ordering service: (1) by mail to Mr. Car-
penter, Rio International's attorney; (2) by mail to Rio International through Rio
International's Florida-based courier; and (3) by electronic mail to Rio Interna-
tional's electronic mail address).
106. See id. (explaining Rio International's response to court-ordered service
of process). Rio International did not argue that it did not receive notice of the
lawsuit or that such notice was incomplete, delayed or prejudicial. See id. at 1019
n.8 (noting Rio International's apparent receipt of notice).
107. See id. at 1013 (describing Rio International's initial reply to court-or-
dered notice). The parties fully briefed the issues central to Rio International's
motion to dismiss. See id. (noting parties' arguments on motion to dismiss).
108. See id. (providing Rio International's actions after court ruling on mo-
tion to dismiss). Rio International's answer denied Rio Properties's allegations
and asserted twenty-two affirmative defenses. See id. (detailing content of Rio In-
ternational's answer).
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discovery requests. 11 9 After failing to comply with resulting discovery or-
ders, the court entered a default judgment against Rio International.I 10
Rio International appealed the district court's ruling to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 1 Among other conten-
tions, Rio International argued insufficient service of process. 12 The cir-
cuit court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that service of
process through electronic mail and complimentary methods satisfied
constitutional requirements.' 13
109. See id. (noting Rio International's responses to Rio Properties's discovery
requests). Rio International's "almost entirely useless" responses consisted largely
of the statement "not applicable." See id. (noting quality of Rio International's
responses to discovery requests).
110. See id. (discussing district court's ultimate disposition of case). Before
granting Rio Properties's motion to compel discovery, the court permitted Rio In-
ternational two informal extensions of time. See id. (noting court's leniency toward
Rio Properties regarding discovery matters). Rio International still failed to ade-
quately respond, however, and the court granted a motion by Rio Properties to
compel discovery. See id. (discussing effect of "futile attempts to elicit good faith
responses from [Rio International]"). Furthermore, the district court warned Rio
International that a failure to comply with its discovery orders would lead to
"preclusive sanctions." See id. (detailing elements of court's discovery order). Rio
International failed to comply with the discovery orders. See id. (noting Rio Inter-
national's response to discovery orders). Thus, the court granted a motion by Rio
Properties for terminating sanctions and entered a default judgment against Rio
International. See id. (discussing court's response to Rio International's failure to
comply with discovery orders). Based on Rio International's bad faith and "repre-
hensible conduct," the court also directed the company to pay reasonable attorney
fees and costs. See id. (same).
111. See id. at 1014 (discussing Rio International's response to default
judgment).
112. See id. (discussing elements of Rio International's appeal). In addition to
its inadequate service of process claim, Rio International also appealed the district
court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, the propriety of the defaultjudgment and
the award of attorney fees and costs. See id. (same).
113. See id. at 1016-19, 1023 (evaluating electronic mail service of process is-
sue and disposing of case). Before considering the constitutionality of electronic
mail-based service of process, the Ninth Circuit appraised whether the district
court complied with FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) when it authorized alternate service. See
id. at 1014-16 (discussing applicability of Rule 4(f) (3)). The court determined that
Rule 4(f) does not create a hierarchy of preferred methods of service of process.
See id. ("[E]xamining the language and structure of Rule 4(f) and the accompany-
ing advisory committee notes, we are left with the inevitable conclusion that service
of process under Rule 4(f) (3) is neither a 'last resort' nor 'extraordinary relief.'").
Thus, even though Rio Properties had not attempted to serve process through
each method enumerated in Rule 4(f), the district court could order alternate
service. See id. (holding that district court properly authorized alternate service
under Rule 4(f)).
After analyzing the service of process issue, the court considered Rio Interna-
tional's other contentions. See id. at 1019-23 (considering other issues raised on
appeal). The circuit court affirmed each lower court decision. See id. at 1023 (af-
firming district court's decisions "in all respects").
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IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Rio Properties, the Ninth Circuit considered whether service of pro-
cess via electronic mail comported with constitutional notions of due pro-
cess. 114 The court first identified the applicable constitutional framework,
derived from the Supreme Court's decision in Mullane.' 15 According to
the court, Mullane outlined a "broad constitutional principle [that] un-
shackles the federal courts from anachronistic methods of service and per-
mits them entry into the technological renaissance." 1 16 That principle
requires only that "the method of service ... be 'reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their
objections.' "117
With its benchmark determined, the court then considered whether
service of process on Rio International crossed the due process thresh-
old.' 18 Like many businesses, Rio International had "embraced" and
"profited immensely" from "the modern e-business model."' 19 Moreover,
Rio International had "structured its business such that it could be con-
114. See id. at 1016-19 (considering reasonableness of electronic mail service
on Rio International). In its discussion, the court also evaluated whether the other
two court-ordered service methods conformed with notions of due process. See id.
at 1017 (discussing whether court-ordered methods of service met due process re-
quirements). According to the court, service through IEC met constitutional re-
quirements. See id. (holding service through IEC appropriate because (1) Rio
International listed IEC's address as its own address when registering allegedly in-
fringing domain names, (2) Rio International relied heavily upon IEC to operate
its business in United States and (3) IEC could effectively pass information to Rio
International in Costa Rica). Likewise, the court also found service upon Mr. Car-
penter constitutional. See id. (finding service upon Mr. Carpenter appropriate be-
cause Rio International specifically consulted him regarding lawsuit).
115. See id. (discussing service of process requirements). For a further discus-
sion of the Mullane due process standard, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying
text.
116. See id. (discussing nature of Mullane holding).
117. See id. at 1016 (discussing constitutional requirements of service of pro-
cess, as identified in Mullane). The court further explained that Mullane did not
require any particular type of notice but only that notice meet the "reasonably
calculated" standard. See id. at 1017 (elaborating on due process requirements of
notice). To evidence this point, the court quoted NewEngland Merchants, in which
a district court authorized service on the defendants through telex. See id. (discuss-
ing New England Merchants).
118. See id. 1017-19 (discussing constitutionality of service of process through
electronic mail). Before considering the matter, the court acknowledged the nov-
elty of its evaluation of service of process through electronic mail. See id. at 1017
(noting that court "tread[ed] upon untrodden ground"). The court found only
one federal case that had previously evaluated service of process through elec-
tronic mail. See id. (discussing lack of authority considering service of process
through electronic mail).
119. See id. at 1017-18 (noting electronic mail's acceptance in business com-
munity, particularly in Rio International's business community).
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tacted only via its email address."1 20 The court concluded, therefore, that
electronic mail service on Rio International more than satisfied the "rea-
sonably calculated" threshold; it functioned as the method of service most
likely to reach Rio International.
12 1
Despite this endorsement, the court also recognized that electronic
mail carries certain limitations.' 2 2 Specifically, the court identified three
categories of potential problems associated with electronic mail service.12
3
First, the court noted potential problems in confirming receipt of an elec-
tronic mail message.' 2 4 Second, the court mentioned issues concerning
verification requirements.1 25  Third, the court discussed potential
problems with attaching and viewing exhibits.' 26
In light of these limitations, the Ninth Circuit called for future courts
to employ a balancing test. 12 7 In particular, district courts should weigh
"the limitations of email service against its benefits."1 28 Thus, the Ninth
Circuit gave trial courts discretion to determine the appropriateness of
service of process through electronic mail in a particular case.1 29
In the case at bar, the Ninth Circuit found that the trial court had
"performed the balancing test admirably, crafting methods of service rea-
sonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise [Rio International]
of the pendency of the action."'130 Thus, the court found that the court-
120. See id. at 1018 (discussing Rio International's e-business model). To sub-
stantiate its point, the circuit court pointed to Rio International's virtually undis-
coverable address and its designation of electronic mail as its preferred contact
medium. See id. (detailing Rio International's use of electronic mail).
121. See id. ("If any method of communication is reasonably calculated to pro-
vide [Rio International] with notice, surely it is email-the method of communica-
tion which [Rio International] utilizes and prefers."). The court extended its
reasoning into a more generalized principle: "when faced with an international e-
business scofflaw, playing hide-and-seek with the federal court, email may be the
only means of effecting service of process." See id. (discussing need for service of
process through electronic mail in certain instances).
122. See id. (discussing limitations of service of process through electronic
mail).
123. See id. (identifying three types of problems with service of process
through electronic mail).
124. See id. ("In most instances, there is no way to confirm receipt of an email
message.").
125. See id. ("Limited use of electronic signatures could present problems in
complying with the verification requirements of Rule 4(a) and Rule I1.").
126. See id. ("[S]ystem compatibility problems may lead to controversies over
whether an exhibit or attachment was actually received [and] [i]mprecise imaging
technology may even make appending exhibits and attachments impossible in
some circumstances.").
127. See id. (identifying appropriate test for future).
128. See id. (discussing specifics of balancing test).
129. See id. (leaving decision to authorize service of process by electronic mail
to discretion of lower courts).
130. See id. at 1018-19 (stating that district court properly used balancing
test).
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ordered service, which included notice through electronic mail, com-
ported with constitutional standards.
13 1
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit had a significantjudicial responsibility in Rio Proper-
ties. 132 Literally, the case marked the first federal appellate court assess-
ment of the core issue underlying service of process through electronic
mail: procedural due process. 13 3 More abstractly, however, Rio Properties
represented the first such consideration of the constitutionality of notice
through any modern technology.13
4
Facing this important endeavor, the Ninth Circuit engaged a ground-
breaking analysis in Rio Properties.13 5 Previously amassed authority had
deemed due process analyses of notice through new technology a one-
dimensional task. 136 The Ninth Circuit, however, recognized that Mul-
lane's true constitutional framework required a more complex considera-
tion of notice in this setting.
13 7
131. See id. at 1019 (holding notice constitutionally sufficient).
132. Cf id. at 1016-19 (evaluating constitutionality of service of process
through new technology).
133. See id. at 1014-19 (evaluating service of process through electronic mail
after noting that investigation did not unearth any circuit court decision providing
a similar consideration); see also Di Edoardo, supra note 9, at 3b (noting that Ninth
Circuit served as first appellate court in nation to authorize notice through elec-
tronic mail); Loomis, supra note 9, at 5 (same); Young, supra note 9, at BI (same);
Geibelson, supra note 9 (same).
134. Cf Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016 (providing list of previous courts approv-
ing notice through modern technologies, which did not include any federal appel-
late courts).
135. See id. at 1014-19 (analyzing due process component of service of process
through electronic mail).
136. Cf Smith v. The Islamic Emirate of Afg., Nos. CIV.A.01-10132, CIV.A.01-
10144, 2001 WL 1658211, at *2-4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) (granting plaintiffs' mo-
tion for service through television broadcast because no other means were likely to
reach defendant); Broadfoot v. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000)
(upholding previous grant of plaintiffs motion for service through electronic mail
and facsimile because means were likely to reach defendant); Cooper v. Church of
Scientology of Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783, 786 (D. Mass. 1982) (affirming magistrate's
grant of plaintiffs motion for service through telex because no other means were
likely to reach defendant); Int'l Schs. Serv. v. Gov't of Iran, 505 F. Supp. 178, 179
(D.NJ. 1981) (granting plaintiff's motion for service through telex because means
were likely to reach defendant); New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power Gener-
ation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting plain-
tiffs motion for service through telex because no other means were likely to reach
defendant).
137. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017-19 (evaluating due process consideration
of notice through new technology). For a further discussion of Rio Properties's un-
precedented interpretation of Mullane, see infra notes 140-53 and accompanying
text.
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Despite this powerful insight, however, the Rio Properties court im-
parted a troublesome legacy on future courts.13 8 Consequently, the Ninth
Circuit may well have compromised the potential worth of this valuable
decision.139
A. Rio Properties: The Groundbreaking Analysis
In Rio Properties, the Ninth Circuit employed a groundbreaking inter-
pretation of the due process requirement underlying notice. 1 4' The court
first correctly extracted the applicable standard from the Supreme Court's
watershed decision in Mullane.14 1 In quotable prose, the court recognized
that Mullane did not require any particular form of notice but only that
such service be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to ap-
prise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the
opportunity to present their objections." 142
Like many courts authorizing notice through a new technology, the
Ninth Circuit first demonstrated defendant's unmistakable preference for
correspondence through the technology at issue, electronic mail.
143
Under Broadfoot, which seems to espouse a black letter rule equating pref-
erence with constitutional sufficiency, this fact alone would suffice to es-
138. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018-19 (failing to delineate appropriate test
for subsequent courts to adopt two-dimensional analysis). For a further discussion
of Rio Properties's ambiguous precedent, see infra notes 154-61 and accompanying
text.
139. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018-19 (providing groundbreaking constitu-
tional analysis of service of process through new technology but failing to provide
definitive precedent for subsequent courts to adopt).
140. See id. at 1016-19 (analyzing due process component of service of process
through electronic mail).
141. Compare Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (noting
that Mullane continues to provide constitutional standard for notice), with Rio
Props., 284 F.3d at 1016-17 (adopting Mullane "reasonably calculated" standard).
For a further discussion of the Mullane due process standard, see supra notes 28-32
and accompanying text.
142. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016-17 (noting that Mullane outlined "broad
constitutional principle [that] unshackles the federal courts from anachronistic
methods of service and permits them entry into the technological renaissance").
143. Compare id. at 1017-18 ("If any method of communication is reasonably
calculated to provide [Rio International] with notice, surely it is email-the
method of communication which [Rio International] utilizes and prefers."), with
F.T.C. v. Zuccarini, No. 01-4854 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2001) (order granting motion for
alternative means of process) (granting plaintiff's motion for service through de-
fendant's preferred communication channel: electronic mail), and Broadfoot v.
Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (upholding grant of plaintiffs
motion for service through defendant's preferred communication channels: elec-
tronic mail and facsimile).
25
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tablish the constitutionality of notice through electronic mail., 44 The
Ninth Circuit, however, required more.
145
Unlike any of its predecessors, the Rio Properties court realized a sec-
ond dimension of due process analysis: a consideration of the unique limi-
tations inherent in the technology at issue. 146 In particular, the court
noted that, as with all modern communication innovations, electronic
mail endures several unavoidable deficiencies. 147 For example, attach-
ments to electronic mail messages, such as summons or complaints, can
only be viewed by a receiver who has a word processing application or
similar program compatible with that of the sender. 148 Accordingly,
144. See Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 720 (holding notice through electronic mail
and facsimile constitutional because defendant preferred those channels of com-
munication). For a further discussion of Broadfoot, see supra notes 61-70, 88-89 and
accompanying text.
Moreover, the notice ordered in Rio Properties would also have sufficed under
the analyses provided in other cases. Compare Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016-19 (al-
lowing service of process via electronic mail where: (1) electronic mail was only
mode of service that had potential to provide defendant notice; (2) defendant had
evaded service; and (3) defendant had actual knowledge of suit), with Smith v. The
Islamic Emirate of Afg., Nos. CIV.A.01-10132, CIV.A.01-10144, 2001 WL 1658211,
at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) (ordering service of process via newspaper publica-
tion and television broadcast where: (1) newspaper publication and television
broadcast were only modes of service that had potential to provide defendants
notice; (2) defendants had evaded service; and (3) defendants had actual knowl-
edge of suits), and Cooper v. Church of Scientology of Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783, 784-
86 (D. Mass. 1982) (ordering service of process via telex where: (1) telex was one
of few modes of service that had potential to provide defendant notice; and (2)
defendant had evaded service), and New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. Iran Power
Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 76-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (allowing
service of process via telex where: (1) telex was only mode of service that had
potential to provide defendant notice; (2) defendant had evaded service; and (3)
defendant had actual knowledge of suits).
145. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (considering unique limitations of elec-
tronic mail).
146. Compare id. (engaging second phase of due process analysis by consider-
ing unique limitations of electronic mail), with Smith, 2001 WL 1658211, at *24
(granting plaintiffs' motion for service through television broadcast without con-
sidering potential limitations of technology), and Broadfoot, 245 B.R. at 722 (up-
holding grant of plaintiff's motion for service through electronic mail and
facsimile without considering potential limitations of technologies), and Cooper, 92
F.R.D. at 786 (affirming magistrate's grant of plaintiffs motion for service through
telex without considering potential limitations of technology), and Int'l Schs. Serv.
v. Gov't of Iran, 505 F. Supp. 178, 179 (D.NJ. 1981) (granting plaintiffs motion
for service through telex without considering potential limitations of technology),
and New Eng. Merchs., 495 F. Supp. at 82 (granting plaintiff's motion for service
through telex without considering potential limitations of technology).
147. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (identifying unique limitations of elec-
tronic mail). For a further discussion of the limitations of electronic mail identi-
fied by the Ninth Circuit, see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
148. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (discussing issues arising over system com-
patibility problems). For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's consideration
of systems compatibility problems, see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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courts must consider these limitations when evaluating the constitutional-
ity of notice through a new technology. 1' 9
Through this second dimension of analysis, the Rio Properties court
seems to theorize that Mullane requires a multi-dimensional conception of
due process.150 Certainly, notice must be reasonably calculated to reach a
defendant.151 But it also must be "of such nature as reasonably to convey
the required information."'15 2 By acknowledging the potential impact of
communication technologies' limitations on this latter fundamental com-
ponent of due process, the Ninth Circuit broke new ground.
153
B. Rio Properties: The Troublesome Legacy
Though providing a complete constitutional framework for analyzing
notice through modern technology, the Rio Properties court imparted a
troublesome legacy on future courts. 1 5 4 In particular, two infirmities lin-
ger in Rio Properties. 155
149. See Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (discussing how courts should consider
limitations of electronic mail). For a further discussion of how Rio Properties guides
courts in considering the limitations of notice through electronic mail or other
technologies, see infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
150. Compare Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-
14 (1950) (identifying due process standard), with Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1016-19
(conducting multi-dimensipnal due process analysis of notice through electronic
mail, under Mullane standard).
151. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-15 (1950) (delineating due process
standard).
152. See i. ("The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information ... and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested
to make their appearance.").
153. Compare Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1018 (engaging second phase of due pro-
cess analysis, considering unique limitations of electronic mail), with Smith v. The
Islamic Emirate of Afg., Nos. CIV.A.01-10132, CIV.A.01-10144, 2001 WL 1658211,
at *24 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001) (granting plaintiffs' motion for service through
television broadcast without considering potential limitations of technology), and
Broadfoot v. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (upholding previous
grant of plaintiff's motion for service through electronic mail and facsimile with-
out considering potential limitations of technologies), and Cooper v. Church of
Scientology of Boston, 92 F.R.D. 783, 786 (D. Mass. 1982) (affirming magistrate's
grant of plaintiff's motion for service through telex without considering potential
limitations of technology), and Int'l Schs. Serv. v. Gov't of Iran, 505 F. Supp. 178,
179 (D.N.J. 1981) (granting plaintiff's motion for service through telex without
considering potential limitations of technology), and New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank
v. Iran Power Generation & Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(granting plaintiff's motion for service through telex without considering potential
limitations of technology).
154. Cf Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1007 (failing to provide clear test through
which subsequent courts can evaluate limitations inherent in use of modern tech-
nologies to effectuate notice).
155. See generally id. (neglecting: (1) to outline practical method for factoring
technology's deficiencies into due process calculation; and (2) to demonstrate
clearly whether balancing test requires consideration of complimentary forms of
notice).
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First, the Ninth Circuit did not outline any practical method for fac-
toring a new technology's deficiencies into a due process calculation.
156
After superficially listing some limitations of electronic mail, the circuit
court simply deferred to the district court "to balance the limitations of
email service of process against its benefits." 15 7 Without further elabora-
tion, it remains unclear how future courts can use Rio Properties to evaluate
a technology's limitations. 1
58
Second, the Ninth Circuit did not clearly demonstrate whether its bal-
ancing test requires consideration of complimentary forms of notice.
159
The court offered: "[T]he district court performed the balancing test ad-
mirably, crafting methods of service reasonably calculated under the cir-
cumstances to apprise [Rio International] of the pendency of the
action." 160 Strictly construed, this statement and, in particular, its refer-
ence to "methods of service" reveals a balancing test that could require con-
sideration of both the technology at issue and other traditional forms of
notice. '
6 1
Despite its frailties, Rio Properties's groundbreaking formulation inevi-
tably will move courts from within the Ninth Circuit and elsewhere to cite
to the decision when confronted with petitions for notice through elec-
tronic mail or, perhaps, some other new communication innovation of
which we cannot currently conceive.' 6 2 Unfortunately, when turning to
this multi-dimensional due process framework for guidance, these courts
will confront the frustrating task of interpreting ambiguous precedent. 1
63
VI. IMPACT
Notwithstanding its troublesome legacy, Rio Properties will directly im-
pact cases sharing similar facts. 1 6 4 The Ninth Circuit's decision demon-
156. See id. at 1018-19 (failing to outline practical method for factoring tech-
nology's deficiencies into due process calculation).
157. See id. at 1018 (leaving it to discretion of district court to apply balancing
test).
158. See id. at 1018-19 (neglecting to elaborate on due process balancing test).
159. See id. (failing to clarify components that courts should consider in bal-
ancing test).
160. Id.
161. See id. (providing explanation of district court's use of balancing test that
remains subject to multiple interpretations).
162. Cf id. at 1016-19 (citing to previous cases considering notice through
modern technology for guidance: Broadfoot and New England Merchants); Broadfoot
v. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 722 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000) (citing to previous case consider-
ing notice through modern technology for guidance: New England Merchants).
163. See generally Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1007-23 (providing unprecedented
and thorough due process analysis of new technology but failing to provide judi-
cially manageable standard for future application).
164. See Di Edoardo, supra note 9, at 3b (concluding that Rio Properties pro-
vides plaintiffs "across the West" with ability to effectuate notice through electronic
mail upon defendants with no physical address); see also Loomis, supra note 9, at 5
(contending that Rio Properties provides plaintiffs with ability to serve notice
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strates that evasive international defendants cannot hide behind their
computer monitors to avoid litigation. 165 As one commentator stated
about Rio Properties's implications: "Defendants who seek to evade service
of process by moving geographically from place to place [now] may be
nailed by a mouse click."
1 66
Though only controlling precedent for district courts within the
Ninth Circuit, Rio Properties is expected to influence the decisions of courts
throughout the country.' 67 The Rio Properties case represents the first and
only federal appellate decision approving service of process by electronic
mail. 16 8 With a rise in cyber-cases that transcend geographic boundaries,
civil procedure experts anticipate that other circuits will soon follow
suit. 169 Until then, regardless of jurisdiction, courts will reference Rio
Properties as persuasive authority. 170
through electronic mail upon on-line businesses and "other entities who operate
wholly in the realm of cyberspace"); Dale C. Cambell, Service of Process in the Age of
eCommerce, at http://www.weintraub.com/practice/articles/ipdrcserviceofpro-
cess.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2002) (contending that Rio Properties provides plain-
tiffs seeking to serve defendants with no known address with ability to serve notice
through electronic mail); Eric J. Sinrod, E-Legal: Served by E-Mail? Blame it on "Rio,"
Apr. 2, 2002, at http://www.law.com (noting that Rio Properties provides plaintiffs in
cases sharing similar facts with ability to serve notice through electronic mail).
165. See 9th Circuit Lets Casino Serve Complaint by E-Mail, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 21,
2002, available at http://www.law.com (quoting professor Ann McGinley, who con-
tends that Rio Properties will make it easier for lawyers to provide notice to elusive
defendants); see also Loomis, supra note 9, at 5 (quoting Columbia Law professor
Michael C. Dorf, who theorizes that Rio Properties represents the principle "if you
live by the Internet, you die by the Internet"); Sinrod, supra note 164 (discussing
impact of Rio Properties on defendants who hide behind their computers to avoid
litigation).
166. Sinrod, supra note 164.
167. See Di Edoardo, supra note 9, at 3b (noting widespread impact of Rio
Properties decision). Cf Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., No. CIV.A.02-0133, 2002 WL
1628933, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002) (citing to Rio Properties in United States
District Court for Western District of New York); Hollow v. Hollow, No. CIV.A.02-
0415, 2002 WL 31056097, at *34 (N.Y.S. Aug. 19, 2002) (citing to Rio Properties in
New York state court).
168. See Rio Props. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that investigation did not unearth any previous circuit court decision eval-
uating service of process through electronic mail); see also Di Edoardo, supra note
9, at 3b (noting that Ninth Circuit served as first appellate court in nation to au-
thorize notice through electronic mail); Loomis, supra note 9, at 5 (same); Young,
supra note 9, at BI (same); Geibelson, supra note 9 (same).
169. See Loomis, supra note 9, at 5 (noting expected rise of subsequent cases
dealing with notice through electronic mail to other federal circuit courts).
170. Cf Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (citing to Rio Properties in United States
District Court for Western District of New York); Hollow, 2002 WL 31056097, at *3-
4 (citing to Rio Properties in New York state court).
29
Chacker: E-Ffectuating Notice: Rio Properties v. Rio International Interli
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2003
VILIANoVA LAW REVIEW
Already, at least two courts outside the Ninth Circuit have cited to Rio
Properties.171 In Ryan v. Brunswick,172 the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York relied upon the Ninth Circuit's decision
when authorizing service of process through regular mail, facsimile and/
or electronic mail.'1 73 Similarly, in Hollow v. Hollow,174 a New York state
court cited to Rio Properties when allowing service of process through elec-
tronic mail alone.' 75 In the Hollow case, the state court adopted Rio Proper-
ties's two-step framework for its constitutional analysis.1 76 Thus, it coupled
the "reasonably calculated to reach defendant" consideration with an eval-
uation of the unique limitations presented by the technology at issue. 177
Commentators have expressed opposing views on Rio Properties's appli-
cations beyond the confines of electronic mail.' 78 On one side, commen-
tators argue that the Ninth Circuit's decision presents a limited, fact-
dependent holding, applying solely to service of process through elec-
tronic mail.' 79 Others contend that this landmark case presents a larger
doctrine relevant to notice through any modern technology. 81
While only judicial constructions will delineate the broader impact of
the Ninth Circuit's ruling, one implication remains indisputable: Rio
171. See Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (citing to Rio Properties in United States
District Court for Western District of New York); Hollow, 2002 WL 31056097, at *3-
4 (citing to Rio Properties in New York state court).
172. No. CIV.A.02-0133, 2002 WL 1628933 (W.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002).
173. See Ryan, 2002 WL 1628933, at *2 (citing to Rio Properties in United States
District Court for Western District of New York).
174. No. CIV.A.02-0415, 2002 WL 31056097 (N.Y.S. Aug. 19, 2002).
175. See Hollow, 2002 WL 31056097, at *3-4 (citing to Rio Properties in New York
state court); see also N. . Court Allows Seroice of Process by E-Mail, ANDREWS COMPUTER
& ONLINE INI)us. LITIc.. REP., Oct. 8, 2002, at 7 (discussing Hollow and noting its
reference to Rio Properties).
176. See Hollow, 2002 WL 31056097, at *34 (applying Rio Properties's due pro-
cess evaluation framework).
177. See id. (applying two-phase analysis of service of process through elec-
tronic mail).
178. Compare Cambell, supra note 164 (noting that Rio Properties has only lim-
ited applications), and Geibelson, supra note 9 (referring to Rio Properties as "highly
fact bound" and "limited"), and Sinrod, supra note 164 (arguing that "courts must
be careful not to paint [Rio Properties] with too broad a brush"), with Young, supra
note 9, at BI (contending that Rio Properties gives courts ability to use technology to
create "custom-fit solutions" for notice in particular cases).'
179. See Cambell, supra note 164 (noting that Rio Properties has only limited
applications); see also Geibelson, supra note 9 (referring to Rio Properties as "highly
fact bound" and "limited"); Sinrod, supra note 164 (arguing that "courts must be
careful not to paint [Rio Properties] with too broad a brush").
180. See Young, supra note 9, at BI (contending that Rio Properties gives courts
ability to use technology to create "custom-fit solutions" for notice in particular
cases).
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Properties demonstrates that notice through a new technology-despite its
limitations-can satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.'
8
'
Aaron I Chacker
181. See generally Rio Props. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that notice through electronic mail can conform with constitu-
tional notions of due process).
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